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Abstract—As recently updated on the vulnerability statistics shown in 2019, Android-driven smartphones, tablet PCs, and other 
Android devices are vulnerable, whether from internal or external threats. Most users store sensitive data like emails, photos, cloud 
storage access, and contact lists on Android smartphones. This information holds a growing-importance for the digital investigation 
process of mobile devices, e.g., internal memory or random-access memory (RAM) forensics, or external memory or read-only 
memory (ROM) forensics on Android smartphones. Internal memory retrieval is considered flawed and difficult by some researchers 
as it alters the digital evidence in an intrusive way. On the other hand, external memory retrieval also called logical acquisition that 
implies the image of logical storage items (e.g., files, database, directories, etc.) that locate on logical storage. This research provides a 
novel methodology that focuses only on internal memory forensic in a forensically sound manner. This research also contributes two 
algorithms, e.g., collect raw information (CRI) for parsing the raw data, and investigate raw information (IRI) for extracting the 
digital evidence to be more readable. This research conducted with fourteenth events to be analyzed, and each event was captured by 
SHA-1 as digital evidence. By using GDrive as the case study, the authors concluded that the proposed methodology could be used as 
guidance by forensics analyst(s), cyberlaw practitioner(s), and expert witness(es) in the court. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Based on the latest update from the global status counter, 
from July 2018 until July 2019, 76.03% of worldwide 
mobile phone users are using the Android mobile operating 
system, 22.04% are using iOS, and the other 1.93% are using 
other mobile operating systems [1]. Android is a mobile 
operating system developed by Google in 2005. The first 
version was released in September 2008 and has been being 
continuously upgraded since then. The current version, 
which is Android 9 "Pie," was released in 2019. From this 
statement, being Android users means that most people in 
the world also rely on Google account, more specifically, the 
Gmail account (Google term of service). Hence, much 
confidential information nowadays is committed to the 
Gmail account, including messages, chat, browsing histories, 
GPS data, photos, even data in the cloud storage [2]. Under 
the increasing number of Gmail accounts worldwide, the 
number of smartphone cybercrimes is also escalating. 
Cybercrime refers to criminal activity done by digital 
technology [3],[4]. This has required an enormous demand 
for Android forensics, and this research guides by opting for 
the GDrive as a study case. 
Android forensics that was introduced in some studies [5], 
[6] had already been developed in various methodologies [7], 
[8]. Android forensics is the successor of digital forensics [9], 
[10]. The first two rules of digital forensics are handling the 
original with the minimum and reporting any changes as 
digital evidence. Android forensics for finding digital 
evidence can be classified into two domains, which are 
volatile memory forensics (RAM analysis) and non-volatile 
memory forensics (internal storage analysis). To the best of 
authors' knowledge, many researchers have discussed the 
non-volatile memory forensics, but investigation about the 
volatile memory forensics still has not been delivering a 
complete direction. For example, the proposed methodology, 
pseudocode(s) used during the examination, scenarios (study 
cases) applied the guidance for the forensics analysts or 
others. 
Some studies in the last five years have provided valuable 
insight into the pros and cons of each methodology. A 
survey and analysis of extraction schemes are conducted 
[11]. Artefacts in ROM memory analysis were produced in 
Microsoft OneDrive [12]. A study fouces on improving the 
speed of memory analysis and the access to non-volatile 
memory [13]. Another study analyzed the malware 
behaviour from memory and verify the results with three 
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different sandbox types [14]. Apart from that, other 
approaches have presented a new methodology to analyze 
firmware update protocols by using fuzz testing [15]. This 
approach made it possible to find five unique methods of 
acquiring data evidence from LG Android smartphones [15], 
a lightweight live memory forensic framework based on 
hardware virtualization [16], a Volatility plugin to automate 
the extraction of data in virtual reality system [17]. 
Given those previous researches, the interest in the 
volatile memory forensics of GDrive is evident since there is 
no publicly known way of rigorous methodology with a 
comprehensive and acceptable manner in cyberlaw. Based 
on the initial research from Satrya and Shin that have done 
thorough non-volatile memory forensics in GDrive, this 
research enhances a new approach for volatile memory 
forensics [8]. The research was conducted using two 
scenarios, e.g., doing Android forensics with the investigator 
and the victim's smartphone being in the same location and 
being in different locations. In the victim's smartphone, 
several scenarios were conducted by using GDrive storage, 
i.e., signup, sign-in, signout, sharing, deleting, renaming, 
new folder, new file. This research used two smartphones as 
clients, Samsung A7 (2016) and Oppo A37F. This research 
proposed a novel methodology focusing on volatile memory 
forensics. The methodology has five phases, which are 
preparation, determination, acquisition, analysis, and 
presentation. The definition for each phase is explained in 
the next section. 
This research proposes another approach in Android 
forensics, which is volatile memory forensics. To the best of 
authors’ knowledge, there is still no published work 
addressing the volatile memory forensics of GDrive on the 
Android platform with comprehensive analysis and 
acceptable manner in front of a court. The original 
contributions of this research can be summarized as follows: 
• providing a novel methodology in volatile memory 
forensics with GDrive as a case study, 
• proposing an algorithm for parsing raw data in volatile 
memory to find the remnant data, 
• analyzing fourteenth events that have been conducted 
to retrieve digital evidence, 
• presenting a report of volatile memory forensics that 
can be used as a reference for investigators, cyberlaw 
practitioners, and forensics analysts. 
 
As for the rest of this research, Section II discusses related 
works, research methodology, proposed framework, and the 
study case. Section III thoroughly explains the memory 
results and discussion summary. Section V summarizes the 
conclusions and future work of this research. 
II. MATERIAL AND METHOD 
A. Literature Review 
Nisioti et al. have introduced an instant messaging data 
recovery method from the volatile memory of Android 
smartphones [7]. The methodology was proved by using a 
case study of four experiments that provided insights into the 
data behaviour in memory. The experimental results showed 
that copious data could be retrieved from the memory, even 
after the device’s battery was removed for a short time. Even 
though the authors have provided a methodology for data 
retrieval, but the chronologies of each step have not been 
addressed well. 
Vella and Cilia examined the possibility of detecting 
insecure inter-app communications inside memory dumps 
[18]. The forensic analysis results revealed the possibility of 
doing it across the various layers of Android’s architecture. 
Android’s Binder implemented the Android inter-app 
communication with support from Android shared memory. 
Despite the framework provided by the authors, the Binder 
still has many limitations. The current detector is valuable, 
but it cannot identify specific targets of implicit intents while 
the presence of multiple target apps. 
Yang et al. developed an automated tool, called AMD, 
that can acquire the entire content of the main memory from 
Android smartphones and smartwatches [19]. The research 
analyzed the firmware update protocols of the devices by 
reverse-engineering the Android bootloader to develop 
AMD. It also designed a method allowing access to the main 
memory data through the firmware update protocols. The 
results showed that AMD surmounted the usability 
constraints of previous main memory acquisition approaches 
and that the main memory data acquired from a smartphone 
or smartwatch could be accurately used in forensic 
investigations. Comparison to existing acquisition methods 
showed that the proposed method could acquire main 
memory data without a system restart, root privilege 
escalation, custom kernel, and screen lock bypass. To the 
best of authors’ knowledge, that AMD still needs to be 
fetched and executed in firmware update mode. In the 
evaluation of AMD, it was also stated that AMD was still 
not identical by comparing it with LiME. 
Ali-Gombe et al. have suggested a new memory forensics 
technique called DroidScraper [20]. It recovers and 
reconstructs in-memory runtime artefacts by relying on the 
design of Android’s ART region-based memory allocation. 
DroidScraper can extract running threads, enumerate objects 
allocated in the heap region, and then decode objects based 
on their class definitions. Albeit the workflow of 
DroidScrapper provided by the authors, e.g., acquisition, 
recovery, and reconstruction, there remains some constraint 
on the experiments. 
Feng et al. have proposed a method for data acquisition in 
Android application memory which is called PASM [21]. It 
can be applied to unprepared Android devices. PASM 
utilizes system-level data migration function provided by 
Android manufacturers to migrate and load the private 
application data into an intermediate device which has been 
pre-flashed with a custom kernel providing the function of 
volatile memory forensics. It makes the private application 
data are possible to be acquired from the volatile memory of 
the intermediate device. However, PASM still has a 
limitation, i.e., the target device supports system-level data 
migration. 
B. Research Methodology 
This research concerned with the previous researchers [5], 
[9] that introduced a four-phase methodology for a digital 
forensics investigation, i.e., identification, preservation, 
analysis, and presentation. Identification is for knowing what 
digital evidence presents, where it is stored, and how it is 
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stored. Preservation is for counting and justifying any kind 
of alteration to the data during the digital evidence 
examination. The analysis is for interpreting the digital data 
information so that it can be readable by other people. The 
presentation is for representing the whole processes taken 
during the investigation to become a final report that is 
legally acceptable. 
Researches in recent years, particularly focusing on 
Android forensics methodology, have been broadening to 
various aspects. To the best of authors' knowledge, Table I 
shows the recent updates in the relevant studies about 
Android memory forensics. Along with a comprehensive 
survey methodology, this research proposed a novel Android 
memory forensics for finding the remnant data in Gdrive 
cloud storage. 
C. Android Memory Forensics 
As illustrated in Fig.1, a new methodology for Android 
memory forensics is proposed. The method is developed 
from [8] and consists of preparation, preservation, analysis, 
and presentation. The proposed methodology supports three 
algorithms, namely, optimal script to assist the dumping 
process, Algorithm 1 for parsing the raw data, and 
Algorithm 2 for extracting the digital evidence to be more 
readable. 
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Fig. 1  Proposed Android memory forensics methodology. 
 
The dump acquired from fry dump contains many dump 
files with a “.data” format related to the app. The files are 
large and still hard to read. In order to overcome this, the 
algorithm takes each dump file and removes the bytes in hex 
so the unprintable characters in ASCII or utf-8 encodings 
were removed, and it reduces the file size significantly. 
Algorithm 1 used a sequence for the hex were removed, so 
the structure of the data inside the dump remained intact. 
The object’s structure was readable in ASCII encoding as it 
was used by the app while in the memory (space and line 
structures remained intact). Google drive uses JSON to store 
data in the memory, so the critical information must be read 
in the same format as it is in the memory in case JSON 
formatted its content is structured spaces and lines.  
 
Algorithm 1. Collect raw information (CRI) 
1: 
2: 
3: 
4: 
5: 
6: 
7: 
8: 
9: 
10: 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
FUNCTION Collect() 
f1   IMPORT “dump” as File 
r1  All lines on f1 
t1  Empty string 
f2  Create new file in "parsed" 
FOR i in r1 THEN 
 t2  Empty String 
 FOR x in i THEN 
  Remove hex \0 to \x08 from x 
  Remove hex \x0C to \x1f from x 
  Remove hex \x7f to \xff from x 
  t2  t2 + x 
 ENDFOR 
 Write t2 to t1 
ENDFOR 
Write t1 to f2 
ENDFUNCTION 
 
Considering plenty of files were produced, Algorithm 2 
focuses on finding the right information out of many 
processed files from Algorithm 1 in detail. The investigator 
needs to specify what information needs to be found as 
string input, and Algorithm 2 investigated all the processed 
files. The processed files were listed as a memory address 
and even the information is duplicated on another address. 
However, the information were still be found by the 
algorithm. Despite the vast amount of information to look 
from, on which line the algorithm found the information 
were recorded as the output for investigator so the 
investigator recognized in detail where the information was 
contained in the memory address and on what line. 
 
Algorithm 2. Investigate raw information (IRI) 
1: 
2: 
3: 
4: 
5: 
6: 
7: 
8: 
9: 
10: 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
FUNCTION investigate() 
found  False 
files  Current Directory + "/parsed" 
INPUT: String to be find 
s1  INPUT 
FOR i in files DO 
 f1  IMPORT i as File 
 r1  All lines on i 
 count  0 
 FOR x in r1 DO 
  count  count + 1  
  IF s1 in x THEN 
   found  True 
   OUTPUT 
Notification 
  ENDIF 
 ENDFOR 
ENDFOR 
ENDFUNCTION 
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TABLE I 
COMPARISON TO RELATED STUDIES 
Research Work Memory Forensic Analyses Method Experiment device Tool & Result 
Vella and Cilia [18] Unclear procedures about Android’s Binder 
System Image (Android 6.0 
API level 23) 
Android’s Binder implemented the 
Android inter-app communication 
with support from Android shared 
memory 
Nisioti et al. [7] 
Providing a methodology for data 
retrieval, but the chronologies of each 
step have not been addressed well. 
Samsung Galaxy III (GT-
I9300) 
By using LiME, the methodology 
was proved by using a case study 
of four experiments that provided 
insights into the data behavior in 
memory.  
Yang et al. [19] 
acquiring the main memory data 
through a firmware update command 
in firmware update mode without 
kernel replacement, without device 
restart, and without root privilege 
 
SHV-E210S, SHV-E210K, 
SHV-E330S, SHV-E330K, 
SM-N900S, SM-N9005, 
LGF180S, LG-F180L, LG-
F240S, LG-F240K, LG-E960, 
SM-V700. 
Acquisition using AMD and 
analysis using LiME, a tool for 
acquiring main memory data from 
smart devices which can easily be 
deployed in forensic investigations 
Ali-Gombe et al. [20] 
Unclear procedures for conducting 
the DroidScrapper memory analyses. 
 
Dalvik Virtual Machine (from 
Android 5.0 and beyond) 
Using DroidScrapper for showing 
acquisition, runtime data structure 
recovery and object recovery and 
reconstruction modules. 
Feng et al. [21] 
Providing only the framework of 
proposed method (PASM) and still 
has a limitation. 
Samsung Galaxy S7 (G9300) 
and Samsung Galaxy S8 
(G9500) 
By using PASM, makes the 
application private data are 
possible to be acquired from the 
volatile memory of the 
intermediate device.  
Proposed 
Preparation, determination, 
acquisition, analysis, and 
presentation 
Android devices: Samsung 
Galaxy A7 (2016) 3GB RAM 
and Nexus 5 2GB RAM 
By using Fridump for finding 
remnant data related to the client’s 
activities focusing on Volatile 
Memory 
    
D. Study Cases 
Initially, there are two Gmail accounts, i.e., first account 
or cariduitayo12@gmail.com and second account or 
cariduitayo13@gmail.com. This test was carried out using 
three types of scenarios, namely: 
• logging in using the first account on the first 
smartphone test, 
• logging in using a second account on the first 
smartphone after the first account was logged out, 
• logging in using the first account and second account 
on the first smartphone simultaneously. 
During the process, every change in the scenarios or 
events was carried out by recording the hash value using 
SHA-128 and then using the factory reset. For the validity of 
the tests in this research, the three scenarios above were 
repeated on the second smartphone using the same proposed 
method. It was expected that identical digital evidence could 
be generated. 
The tools used in this research were:  Python 3.7.3 to 
perform scripting and analyzing, Frida-server 12.6.5 should 
be switched on to gain access to Android memory level. 
Fridump v0.1 to perform dumping of the memory contents. 
Nano 4.2 to do a quick examination of the raw data. Magisk 
manager v18.1 to gain rooted access.  This research opted 
for Google Drive v2.19.192.05.35 as the study case. By 
following the rules of digital forensics practice, the two 
devices used as experimental objects in this research were 
put through a rooting process. The first tests were conducted 
on Samsung A7-2016 SM-A710L (Android 7.0) for the 
remnant data that was leftover. The second test was carried 
out on OPPO A37f (Android 5.1.1) for the validation of the 
whole processes in Samsung A7-2016. 
III. RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
A. Memory Forensics Analysis 
1)  Dealing with the first account 
In the first scenario, three events were carried out, namely 
login, logout, and logout with a restart. The first event, login, 
was carried out using the first account on Samsung A7-2016. 
Fig. 2 shows the activities of the user after logging in, with 
the condition in which the smartphone was still switched on. 
By using Algorithm 1 and 2, the digital evidence that can be 
obtained are user information, i.e., Gmail account, name, 
created date, modified data. 
The moment after the first account has been logged out, 
the first smartphone (Samsung A7-2016) was dumped by fry 
dump to get information related to what happened after the 
account was logged out. The initial dump automatically 
dumped all addresses of the memory-related to it by 
specifying the Google Drive application’s name 
(com.google.android.apps.docs) on the fry dump. The result 
of this phase was that the 1st account information still exists 
on the memory, as shown in Fig. 3. 
After the logout has been carried out and the device has 
been restarted, the event was to examine the data inside the 
memory to find out whether data related to the already 
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logged out account were still can be traced or not. Fig. 4 
showed the results of the examination, which was the 
information related to the account have still existed. This 
was done to prove either the memory volatility does matter 
or not in this case or application (e.g., Gdrive). It turned out 
that the memory was still stored with information from the 
previously loaded data. Following the preservation phase, 
the hash values (see Appendix A) were taken from the three 
events. 
 
 
Fig. 2 Digital evidence for first account login activity. 
 
 
Fig. 3 Digital evidence for first account logout activity. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 Digital evidence for first account logout activity in 0xcb700000 
memory address. 
2)  Dealing with file operations 
For the second scenario, six events were carried out, 
namely file upload, file download, file share, file share 
(revoke), new file, delete the file. The hash values were 
taken per event and attached in Appendix A. Fig. 4 shows a 
file-sharing event where the first account shares files to the 
second account. Based on the digital evidence, both accounts 
can be seen along with the shared files. In this scenario, we 
discussed two file operations as a representative, and further 
complete analyses are provided in Table II that is presented 
in the next section. 
 
 
Fig. 5 Digital evidence for first account uploading activity 
 
The first account has uploaded a file named 
forensic_evidence.txt. By using Algorithm 2, it 
helpedthe investigator to find the uploaded file, created file, 
modified date, and last viewed by expressing the input 
related to the targeted information. From the in-depth 
analysis, digital evidence related to the uploaded file were 
remained in the smartphone (see Fig. 5). The other digital 
evidence for that uploaded file that was in the directory or 
the link can also be used as references in the investigation. 
Initiating this event, the "Sample Sheet" file had been 
created in the GDrive of the first account. This event 
addressed the deleted file in the Gdrive account. As can be 
seen in Fig. 6, it showed that information, e.g., title, version, 
created date, modified date, last viewed can still be acquired 
from deleted files. Other important evidence related to file 
location was alternate link and default open link that also can 
be referred to as digital evidence. However, recovering the 
deleted file still needs to be investigated in further research. 
 
 
Fig. 6 Digital evidence for first account deleted file activity 
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TABLE II 
EXPERIMENT RESULTS FOR FINDING REMNANT DATA 
Event Found Result Information Found 
After Login (first 
account) Yes  Found Details of the Account  First Logged in of first account 
After Logout (first 
account) Yes Details of the Account still can be found Logged out from first account 
After Logout then 
Reboot Yes Found Email address (no details found) Reboot after Logging out from first account (then dump) 
Create File (Sheet) Yes Found File details  Created a Sheet file (named "Sample Sheet") and Dump 
Update File Yes Second account listed as the Last Modifier File (Secondary Sheet) updated by second account on 
another device, and dump 
Delete File Yes Deleted file (Sample Sheet) Information still 
exists along with the details Deleted a file (Sample Sheet) and dump 
File Upload Yes Uploaded file details found with Date Information and Uploader Information Uploaded a file (forensic_evidence.txt) to first account 
File Download Yes The downloaded files information still exists 
along with its download path on the phone Downloaded a file and dump 
File Share (first 
account) Yes 
Permission Details found, Share Date found, 
User and Uploader Information found 
First account shared a file (forensic_evidence-1.txt) with 
second account 
File Share Revoked 
(second account) Yes 
No readable Permission Details Information, 
Account and file info found First account revoked access file of second account 
File Share Revoked 
(Reboot) Yes 
There is no readable Permission Details 
Information, Account and file info found 
First account revoked access file of second account then 
reboot 
Logout after Upload Yes The information of Files and Account still 
exist 
Logged out from first account after uploading a file 
(forensic_evidence.txt) 
Switch After Upload Yes The first account and its file information 
exist 
- Logged in with multiple accounts (first account and 
second account) 
- Uploaded a file to first account (forensic_evidence.txt) 
- Switched to second account, and dump 
Switch After Upload 
(Reboot) Yes 
The first account and its files information 
exist but scrambled 
- Logged in with Multiple Accounts (first account and 
second account) 
- Uploaded a file to first account (forensic_evidence.txt) 
- Switched to second account 
-Reboot 
-Opened Gdrive (Gdrive would open last switched 
account by default) 
 
3)  Dealing with multiple accounts 
In the third scenario, the first account and second account 
simultaneously logged in on the first smartphone. Firstly, 
user-a logged in without logging out, then user-b also logged 
in without logging out. Secondly, there were two events in 
this scenario, i.e. files sharing from first account to second 
account without rebooting and with rebooting. Because the 
Gdrive supports logging in using multiple accounts, this test 
was conducted to find out the digital evidence left behind 
when that happens. 
 
 
Fig. 7 Digital evidence for the first account and the second account is 
logging in at the same smartphone. 
 
In both events for this scenario, the two accounts were 
logged in in the same smartphone by using two events, i.e., 
multiple accounts without restart and multiple accounts with 
a restart. By continuing the previous scenario (uploaded file), 
a sample file has been given as verification that the file was 
uploaded by the first account. After some time, the Gdrive 
second account was logging in without logging out the first 
account. This scenario gave two kinds of results, i.e., 
multiple accounts without a restart (as shown in Fig. 7), and 
multiple accounts with a restart (as depicted in Fig. 8). From 
those two events, the investigator can still extract prominent 
digital evidence. 
 
 
 
Fig. 8 Digital evidence for the first account, and the second account is 
logging in at the same smartphone after the restart. 
B. Discussion for Presentation 
The memory data structures acquired in this research were 
all resumed based on the events that have been conducted as 
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can be seen in Table II.  This played an important role in 
locating the proper information and results. For instance, 
translating raw data memory from bytes to ASCII (American 
Standard Code for Information Interchange) that contain 
critical information for the investigator yielded an enormous 
amount of potential memory addresses. The proposed 
methodology can be used as guidance for the investigator to 
find the digital evidence related to Gdrive cloud storage. 
To the best of authors’ knowledge, technological 
limitation of fry dump might not meet all the expectations of 
the investigator related to Gdrive cloud storage, e.g., 
recovery of deleted files, password of the users, or some 
missing after rebooted. On the other hand, it is also possible 
to support the anti-forensics because of the incomplete 
information retrieved from the memory data structure. Even 
though this research has provided fourteen events (as digital 
evidence), many further features or incoming versions of 
Gdrive cloud storage applications need to be evaluated. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Based on the three scenarios consist of fourteenth events 
that have been conducted, a novel methodology for Android 
memory forensics has been proposed, and the conclusion of 
this research was drawn. This paper presented two 
algorithms for supporting the analysis phase. Those 
algorithms were justified as guidance during the 
investigation processes. Furthermore, the experiment results 
have provided essential digital evidence to support the 
investigator and to provide knowledge for cyberlaw 
practitioner(s) about Android memory forensic, especially 
on the cloud storage client. Consequently, it is important in 
the future to develop Android memory forensics 
methodology by using the network connection with the 
victim's smartphone being a different place from where the 
investigator(s) is. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
This research was a collaboration between School of 
Applied Science and School of Computing, Telkom 
University. This research was also funded by PPM, Telkom 
University. 
REFERENCES 
[1] Statcounter. (2019) Mobile Operating System Market Share 
Worldwide. [Online]. Available: http://gs.statcounter.com/os-market-
share/mobile/worldwide. 
[2] Google Drive. (2019) Google Drive Terms of Service. [Online]. 
Available: https://www.google.com/drive/terms-of-service/. 
[3] Holt, Thomas J., Adam M. Bossler, and Kathryn C. Seigfried-Spellar. 
Cybercrime and digital forensics: An introduction. Routledge, 2017. 
[4] Caviglione, Luca, Steffen Wendzel, and Wojciech Mazurczyk. "The 
future of digital forensics: Challenges and the road ahead," IEEE 
Security & Privacy, vol. 15, issue 6, pp. 12-17, 2017. 
[5] Ogazi-Onyemaechi, Bernard Chukwuemeka, Ali Dehghantanha, and 
K-KR Choo. "Performance of android forensics data recovery tools," 
Contemporary Digital Forensic Investigations of Cloud and Mobile 
Applications, Syngress, pp. 91-110, 2017. 
[6] Lin, Xiaodong. "Android Forensics." Introductory Computer 
Forensics. Springer, Cham, pp. 335-371, 2018. 
[7] Nisioti, Antonia, et al. "You can run but you cannot hide from 
memory: Extracting IM evidence of Android apps," 2017 IEEE 
Symposium on Computers and Communications (ISCC). IEEE, 2017. 
[8] Satrya, Gandeva Bayu, and Soo Young Shin. "Proposed Method for 
Mobile Forensics Investigation Analysis of Remnant Data on Google 
Drive Client," Journal of Internet Technology, vol. 19, issue 6, pp. 
1741-1751, 2018. 
[9] McKemmish, Rodney. What is forensic computing? Canberra: 
Australian Institute of Criminology, 1999. 
[10] Årnes, André, ed. Digital forensics. John Wiley & Sons, 2017. 
[11] Scrivens, Nathan, and Xiaodong Lin. "Android digital forensics: data, 
extraction and analysis." Proceedings of the ACM Turing 50th 
Celebration Conference, China, 2017, pp. 1-10. 
[12] Gandeva Bayu Satrya, A. Ahmad Nasrullah, and Soo Young Shin. 
“Identifying artefact on Microsoft OneDrive client to support 
Android forensics”, International Journal of Electronic Security and 
Digital Forensics, vol 9, issue 3, 269-291, 2017. 
[13] Sylve, Joseph T. "Towards real-time volatile memory forensics: 
frameworks, methods, and analysis." Dissertation Thesis. University 
of New Orleans, 2017. 
[14] C. Tien, J. Liao, S. Chang and S. Kuo, "Memory forensics using 
virtual machine introspection for Malware analysis," 2017 IEEE 
Conference on Dependable and Secure Computing, Taipei, 2017, pp. 
518-519. 
[15] Park, Juhyun, Yun-Hwan Jang, and Yongsu Park. "New flash 
memory acquisition methods based on firmware update protocols for 
LG Android smartphones," Digital Investigation, vol. 25, pp. 42-54, 
2018. 
[16] Cheng, Yingxin, et al. "A lightweight live memory forensic approach 
based on hardware virtualization," Information Sciences, vol. 379, pp. 
23-41, 2017. 
[17] Casey, Peter, et al. "Inception: Virtual Space in Memory Space in 
Real Space–Memory Forensics of Immersive Virtual Reality with the 
HTC Vive," Digital Investigation, vol. 29, pp. S13-S21, 2019. 
[18] Vella, Mark, and Rachel Cilia. "Memory Forensics of Insecure 
Android Inter-app Communications." ICISSP, Porto, 2017, pp.481-
486. 
[19] Yang, Seung Jei, et al. "Live acquisition of main memory data from 
Android smartphones and smartwatches," Digital Investigation, vol. 
23, pp. 50-62, 2017. 
[20] Ali-Gombe, Aisha, et al. "DroidScraper: A Tool for Android In-
Memory Object Recovery and Reconstruction." 22nd International 
Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses (RAID). 
Beijing, 2019, pp. 547-559. 
[21] P. Feng, Q. Li, P. Zhang and Z. Chen, "Private Data Acquisition 
Method Based on System-Level Data Migration and Volatile 
Memory Forensics for Android Applications," in IEEE Access, vol. 7, 
pp. 16695-16703, 2019. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1014
APPENDIX A 
DETAILS OF ACQUISITION DUMPING MEMORY HASH VALUES 
 
Scenario Event Acquisitioned File Name SHA-1 Hash Value (128 bits) 
1 (Single Account) 
Primary: First account 
After Login (First account) 0xb7e00000.data 151801bdbc658feeee64ac539ffda39df4d3c0dd 
After Logout (First account) 0xb7c80000.data 0f8dc18cd30195cbc1b8188e05c16aa5c74df363 
After Logout then Reboot 0xcb700000. data 4a72b21210f2e4cf827e1daabe697e09b21a893b 
2 (File Operation) 
Primary: First account 
Secondary: Second 
account 
Create File (Sheet) 0x12d21000. data 4023e24c92af78979b517b2c27d409b5d74d4790 
Update File 0xc0e00000. data 26aa57d01b7ac628a3d706f1f6a5448b9e353cee 
Delete File 0xd0100000. data 4b124b393e775d21bcb1ee273837567736f9c6b3 
File Upload 0x12d28000. data 4375fcfcb886ee56f2aeb6332f200647a31a940c 
File Download 0xc1e00000. data 83e7beed4ef142022c61f58219a4bf35fee51e9b 
File Share (First account) 0xc2000000. data 3ad5b75722a776333c7a46eb680ef3665053bc66 
File Share Revoked (Second 
account) 0xc1780000. data f337dcbb68481a873876fa4dcb3143518a72a14d 
File Share Revoked 
(Reboot) 0xca080000. data 64e5f346c55ac871e262cb66d773929056202870 
Logout after Upload 0xc9c80000. data bc7d5c5229d70f7ebbefb685e4d76838c803ac99 
3 (Multiple Account) 
Both users are logging 
in 
Switch After Upload 0xc8b00000. data 2f75ccfc9a944c2738793ed6ee0dc5be253dded7 
Switch After Upload 
(Reboot) 0xc6b00000. data 4ab5b1ac40d83dd5cf623fdcf5f29667746177ef 
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